Cambodia: Hun Sen Tightens Control

March 03, 2006 22 48 GMT

STRATFOR

Summary

Prince Norodom Ranariddh, president of Cambodia's royalist FUNCINPEC party, resigned his post as president of the National Assembly because he was "too busy to meet his party members." Ranariddh's resignation comes as Prime Minister Hun Sen of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) tightens his control over the National Assembly ahead of 2008 national elections, reducing the power of his coalition partner, FUNCINPEC. While signifying further strains in the CPP-FUNCINPEC alliance, the political machinations in Phnom Penh are unlikely to lead to a significant deterioration in Cambodia's overall security environment.

Analysis

The president of Cambodia's National Assembly, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, resigned March 3, ostensibly to focus more on his role as president of the royalist FUNCINPEC party. Ranariddh's resignation comes a day after the National Assembly revised the Cambodian Constitution to require just 50 percent plus one of the National Assembly to form a government, rather than the previous two-thirds majority threshold. Also March 2, Prime Minister Hun Sen of the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) eliminated two co-ministerial positions in his Cabinet, dismissing the co-minister of national defense and the co-minister of the interior, both of whom are FUNCINPEC members.

While the two co-ministers will remain deputy prime ministers in Cambodia's complex government, the combination of actions was a clear signal from Hun Sen that the CPP is weaning itself from continued dependence on its on-again, off-again coalition partner, FUNCINPEC. The two parties have been rivals and partners for more than a decade, moving between open warfare and cooperative policies. But as Hun Sen moves to eliminate the need for FUNCINPEC, the chance of a return to the days of actual violence between the parties seems distant.

Hun Sen and Ranariddh are both positioning themselves and their parties for Cambodia's 2008 general elections. In the 2003 National Assembly elections, the CPP won 73 of the 123 seats, shy of the 82 needed to form a government under the old system. The constitutional change, however, lowers the threshold to 62 seats, well within the CPP's grasp. In addition, Hun Sen feels more confident in his CPP in the wake of a successful Senate election (though only National Assembly members and select local commune council members voted).

Interestingly, it was apparently perennial opposition candidate Sam Rainsy of the eponymous Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) who suggested the constitutional change. Rainsy has been in self-exile after having his parliamentary immunity revoked in early 2005. Following the recent Senate elections, Rainsy was pardoned by the king and returned to Cambodia, where he and Hun Sen publicly ended their long-standing disputes.

For Rainsy, whose party always places a distant third, the only chance to get into the government is through a coalition with Hun Sen -- a rather unlikely prospect -- or with FUNCINPEC (FUNCINPEC and the SRP once formed an Alliance of Democrats to challenge the CPP). By lowering the threshold for government formation, the chances of a FUNCINPEC-SRP alliance are higher (if ever so slightly). For Hun Sen, the prospect of single-party rule rather than the incessant trials of a coalition government was too tempting to pass up, and he remains confident in the CPP's ability to retain power. In the short term, Hun Sen stands to benefit most, but Rainsy is counting on this eventually to allow a shift in power.

The current political maneuvering has raised concerns that the existing CPP-FUNCINPEC alliance is about to collapse, throwing Cambodia back into chaos, given the history of coups and insurgency in the relationship between the CPP and FUNCINPEC. However, both Hun Sen and Ranariddh are working to maintain the coalition ahead of the 2008 elections. Despite the removal of the co-ministerial positions, for example, the two FUNCINPEC officers were kept on as deputy prime ministers. Both the CPP and FUNCINPEC are also keeping an eye on the perceptions of foreign donors, whose money goes a long way toward keeping the country functioning. A descent into open warfare would do little for either side, since both want to maintain the flow of foreign monies.

And this is raises one further point lending to the continued restraint against a renewed civil conflict. The international community continues to offer only minimal concrete support for the opposition parties in Cambodia. In fact, the failure of the Alliance of Democrats was due in large part to the lack of actionable support from donors or other outside influences, which proved quite useful in the recent "color" revolutions in various former nations formerly belonging to the Soviet Union. Donors are looking at Cambodia as a place that at least offers stability, if not broad-scale freedoms and democracy. And given the international concern with Islamist militancy, the fact that Cambodia remains largely off-limits to militants also appeals to foreigners.

Stability, then, rather than any radical reform, is what international donors look for in Cambodia. Those who take a more strategic view of Cambodia's location, such as China, Japan, India and the United States, also view the current system as better than the potential consequences of interference. Thus, while the political niceties seen in recent weeks will likely shift into the more traditional competition for hearts and minds ahead of the 2008 elections, the likelihood of the security environment seeing a sharp downturn is low.