Neatee Koun Khmers: Exploring the concept of political institutions

I jumped at the chance to discuss political institutions when a fellow blogger suggested the topic. To this end, I am thankful to one of the participants in the forum who suggested a research by Bueno De Mesquita et al. (1999) as part of this week discussion. Isn’t this wonderful that there is so much knowledge out there? I am also grateful for all participants who have been sharing ideas and perspectives in the forum. In the past, educated Khmers tend to separate themselves, and their knowledge made them too prestigious to engage with ordinary people. Now, sharing is a norm. And I am very proud that we are sharing.

Everyone has made significant contributions to the forum, and we have just proved that it is possible to have civilized dialogues. True dialogue, according to Freire (1993), cannot exist unless the dialoguers engage in critical thinking. What we are doing here is crucial (though this does not replace a formal education). By getting together to discuss ideas and concepts we are building a foundation for all to engage in critical thinking. Critical thinking enables one to look and understand situations beyond the obvious.

In the past weeks, we have explored the concept of sovereignty, leadership, and responsibility. This week we attempt to connect the concept of accountability and responsibility with political institutions. Political institutions are where all the important decisions are made that impact people’s liberty, social quality, national sovereignty, economy, political stability, and the country’s long term direction. Thus, who sets national agenda and manages political processes in these institutions makes a big difference in the people’s lives and the future of a nation.

What is your perspective of political institutions? How do you see political institutions? Do they function the way you have envisioned? Do they serve the national interests? Are they democratic political institutions? I am sure your perspective, experience, and knowledge will make this discussion a very interesting one.

Meanwhile, allow me to look into the concept from a particular angle. I found Terry M. Moe’s (2005) view of political institutions very appealing while Peter Burnell (2006) provided an interesting context to the definition of autocracy that will enhance our understanding of the concept presented by Bueno De Mesquita et al. (1999). Due to space limitation in this forum, I will only focus on one aspect of the research that is how leaders manage to stay in office in light of their policy failure.

Terry M. Moe (2005) has a realist view of political institutions. “The problem, as I saw it, was that the theory tended to view political institutions as structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action problems and benefit all concerned, when in fact the political process often gives rise to institutions that are good for some people and bad for others depending on who has the power to impose their will. Institutions may be structures of cooperation, I argued, but they may also be structures of power” (p. 215).

Within institutional context in a democracy, policy makers may still find loopholes to manipulate political processes to give themselves advantages. “Whoever wins has the right to make decisions on behalf of everyone else, and whoever loses is required by the law backed by the police powers of the state to accept the winners' decisions. This means that any groups that prevail under the formal rules can legitimately use public authority to impose bureaucratic institutions that are structurally stacked in their own favor, and that may make the losers worse off, perhaps by a lot” (Moe, 2005, p. 218).

In a political system that structures with term limits and with checks and balances, elections ultimately tend to create equilibrium among competing factions or political parties; however, the absence of which may create a different political outcome. What intended to be a democracy may end up as something else entirely difference. Autocracies seem to be default for the ‘non-transitions’ as developing nations are experimenting and transitioning to democracy. Peter Burnell (2006) who observed the wave of democratization process among developing nations in the last decades provided this observation:

…Autocracies can be understood as political regimes where competitive political participation is sharply restricted or suppressed and the power holders reserve a right to determine the rights and freedoms everyone else enjoys, while being largely free from institutional constraints themselves. In a fundamental sense such claims to arbitrary or unlimited power mean the ruled must be unfree, even if in practice the people are permitted some liberties to a certain degree, for example some economic freedoms, at the autocrat’s discretion. (p. 546)

In a democracy, there is reciprocity of responsibility and accountability between voters and their representatives. Voters have the responsibility to elect their representatives to these political institutions. In turn, the representatives have the accountability to set national policies that encapsulate national interests. Base on this assumption, one would assume that successful policies are ones that promote peace and prosperity and that politicians are motivated to enhance their nation’s welfare to enhance their chances for continuing in offices; and those leaders “who ruin their country’s economy…and who fail to provide for the welfare of their citizens must have poor prospects of staying in power” (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 1999, p. 147).

More importantly, “How do those who responsible for fail policy survive?” Bueno De Mesquita et al.(1999) argued that the character of the political system that chooses a nation’s leader has a great deal to do with the instances where small failures of policy will lead to the removal of the leader, but in others, “seemingly endless blunders have little or no consequence for the leader’s retention in office” (p. 148). The politics of maintaining winning coalitions plays a major role in maintaining the power. Bueno De Mesquita et al. (1999) wrote:

Politicians attract a winning coalition and retain its support by distributing things of value. Put coarsely, they "buy" office. Broadly, the goods used to do this take two forms, and their relative value depends on the institutional arrangements of the state. Some are distributed in the form of private goods, such as special privileges, access to graft and bribes, favorable tax terms, favorable contracts, judicial favoritism, and the like. These private goods are allocated only to the members of the winning coalition whose continued support is essential for the incumbent to remain in office. Other goods take the form of public policies that affect the welfare of everyone in the state. The provision of political freedoms, national security, general economic growth policies that lift the total size of the pool of resources in the state, and the like are examples of such public policies that affect citizens of the state. (p. 149)

The general principle here is that the winning coalition gets bigger, private goods get spread more thinly, and so they less easily can make up for failed public policies. Conversely Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, p. 154) suggested, “A political system with small winning coalitions and a large selectorate (usually implying rigged elections) is quite beneficial for leaders. It helps them keep their jobs and their access to private benefits, even when they perform poorly in the policy arena.” In such scenario the political survival of the leadership is not threatened even when facing with policy failure are typical autocracies.

In closing, I am glad we have a chance to discuss this concept simply because those who prevail in a political system to have the authority to set policies in political institutions wheel tremendous power. What they do impacts almost every aspect of the people’s lives and hence the nation’s future. In a political system without term limits and/or checks and balances, citizens must take the responsibility to monitor their elected leaders seriously and carefully. Without monitoring, the leaders may use their institutional power to create policies that give themselves advantages and to subvert public interest and public good into private gain. To monitor such government requires vigilant and rigorous analysis from all responsible citizens.

I am truly humble and honored to have an opportunity to be part of this forum. Please freely express yourself.

P.S. Merry Christmas and Happy New Year.

References

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M. & Smith, A. (1999). Policy failure and political survival: The contribution of political institutions. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43(2), 147-161.

Burnell, P. (2006). Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters. Third World Quarterly, 27(4), 545-562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710.

Freire, P. (1993). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York and London: Continuum

Moe, T. M. (2005). Power and political institutions. Perspectives on politics.

Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jun., 2005), pp. 215-233 Published by: American Political Science Association.