Sam Rainsy's Strategy: Push Hun Sen, then beat him at the polls

Reference ID: 06PHNOMPENH327
Created: 2006-02-17 09:20
Released: 2011-07-11 00:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Phnom Penh

VZCZCXRO0714
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0327/01 0480920
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170920Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6041
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2351
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2196
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0372
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0506
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0524
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3050
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1318C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000327

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM CB
SUBJECT: SAM RAINSY'S POLITICAL STRATEGY: PUSH HUN SEN,
THEN BEAT HIM AT THE POLLS

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Margaret McKean, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Opposition leader Sam Rainsy says that
reconciliation with Hun Sen was the only way to improve his
party's position in upcoming national elections and provide
hope for the democratic future of Cambodia. Rainsy hopes
that his continued ability to move the government towards
desired reforms within important national institutions will
solidify democracy in Cambodia -- and his detractors (both
here and abroad) will recognize the wisdom of his actions.
Rainsy said that Hun Sen is a fact of life and his only hope
of helping democracy is to work with the PM to make changes
that will benefit Cambodians in the long run. The political
landscape is shifting, says Rainsy, and it is unclear which
parties will be standing for election in 2008; FUNCINPEC may
disappear, CPP could split, and there could be other
opposition parties that form between now and elections. The
Sam Rainsy Party, however, will continue to work on the side
of democracy and the Cambodian people and seek to eventually
become the ruling party in the future. End Summary.

Sam Rainsy Explains Himself
---------------------------



¶2. (C) On February 17, opposition leader Sam Rainsy,
accompanied by SRP Standing Committee member Mu Sochua, met
with the Ambassador, DCM, and Pol/Econ Chief to outline his
political thinking that led to the rapprochement with Prime
Minister Hun Sen. Rainsy said that he has undertaken a
political reconciliation with Hun Sen, and described the
process as just beginning and therefore very fragile -- and
one that could be reversed. At the moment, the continuation
of the process depends on the mood of the PM and not on
existing democratic institutions. Hun Sen decides everything
in Cambodia, and the government institutions, e.g., the
courts, the parliament, are just a "facade," complained
Rainsy. If Cambodia is ruled by one man, then in order to
get anything done, one must begin by talking to that man,
said the opposition leader, who added it had been a difficult
choice. He noted that he risked the support of many friends
inside and outside Cambodia to put some trust into a dialogue
with Hun Sen, but hopes that dialogue will yield positive
results for Cambodia.

¶3. (C) Rainsy credited the international community's
interest and support over the past year, as well as the U.S.
Embassy's work on his behalf, as critical to arriving at the
situation in Cambodia today. In public, Rainsy said that he
uses the Prime Minister's rhetoric of the reconciliation
being a Khmer-Khmer solution, but in reality he knows that
Hun Sen never would have reached this stage without outside
pressure. He acknowledged that he has been criticized by
colleagues and friends for having given in, but Rainsy
insisted that he made the right choice for the right reasons.
In order to reach a democratic state in Cambodia, much needs
to happen but it all comes down to building democratic
institutions. That can only happen through a more
independent and transparent political process and elections
where average citizens are free to exercise their right to
vote without intimidation.

¶4. (C) Rainsy explained that Cambodians were afraid to be
associated with the Sam Rainsy Party because the CPP had told
them that Sam Rainsy is an enemy who cannot be allowed into
power without civil war breaking out. This strategy of
manipulating poor, uneducated peasants who value stability
after the 25 years of genocide and civil war hurt the SRP, he
stated. If Rainsy is seen to be working with the government
in a constructive way and the PM no longer characterizes
Rainsy as an enemy, people will be more willing to vote in
accordance with their beliefs. From Hun Sen's perspective,
if can he can work with the democrats like Rainsy and human
rights leader Kem Sokha, it will be politically advantageous
for him as well. Rainsy said Hun Sen wants better relations
with the West, particularly the United States, and recognizes
Rainsy can help him on that front.

¶5. (C) Rainsy allowed that his year in exile showed that he
cannot reform Cambodia's political institutions from the
outside as his party would only become more marginalized.
The PM has agreed to SRP representation in the Constitutional

PHNOM PENH 00000327 002 OF 002


Council and the National Election Commission; two crucial
institutions for delivering free and fair elections in 2008,
he noted. By being part of those institutions, the SRP will
be in a stronger position to stand for upcoming elections,
claimed Rainsy. Rainsy said that it has been helpful to his
political future for the Prime Minister to suggest that the
CPP would invite the SRP to join a coalition government with
them in 2008. Rainsy said he would also invite the CPP to
join him if the SRP wins. In either event, it shows the
populace that the parties are not enemies but constructive
partners for the betterment of Cambodia's future. If the SRP
can also show results to the population, that will also help
their chances, he said. Hun Sen has complained to Rainsy
about the poor governors, ministers and other public
officials within the system and asked that Rainsy help him
with necessary reforms. Already, the PM is taking my advice,
said Rainsy, referring to the PM's instructions to one of his
advisors to resolve a dispute between businessmen in Kampong
Thom and provincial authorities. Rainsy appealed to the PM
to assist in this matter as an advocate for the businessmen,
and the PM agreed. These results help the PM take credit but
Rainsy said that people will also see him as the catalyst for
change and credit him as well.

Future of the Political Parties
-------------------------------

¶6. (C) Rainsy described the political landscape in Cambodia
as shifting and one that could change dramatically before
¶2008. FUNCINPEC has been a poor partner to the CPP in
government, and Rainsy said that his political reconciliation
with Hun Sen has given the PM the opportunity to get rid of
FUNCINPEC. Rainsy noted that the Prime Minister is unhappy
with members of his own party -- the old guard whose
interests lean towards Vietnam and others whom Rainsy
characterized as the "mafia" types within the party. Rainsy
would not be surprised if Hun Sen split the CPP and created
his own party to rid himself of those people. Another factor
is the political future of Hun Sen's son, Hun Manet. Rainsy
noted that Hun Sen has political ambitions for his son, but
it remains to be seen if those are shared by others in the
CPP. Rainsy also does not believe FUNCINPEC will survive; he
speculated that FUNCINPEC supporters will move either towards
the CPP or the SRP. Any party that depends on handouts from
the CPP but has no interest in governing cannot survive,
summed up Rainsy; the SRP envisions itself as the governing
party someday -- if not 2008 then in the future.

¶7. (C) As far as the creation of other opposition parties,
Rainsy acknowledged that human rights leader and director of
the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), Kem Sokha, was
a factor and potential party leader in his own right. If the
Sam Rainsy Party falters, suggested Rainsy, Kem Sokha would
see an opportunity and likely form a party to assume the
mantle of the political opposition. However, if the SRP is
strong, Kem Sokha will not come forward, predicted Rainsy.


Comment
-------

¶8. (C) Rainsy has a clear strategy for his party's
political future and hopes to capitalize on his credibility
as a democrat to move the Prime Minister along the path of
democratic reform to the SRP's electoral advantage in 2008.
He also appears to have been influenced by the yawning
leadership void in the life of the political opposition in
Cambodia during his year in exile, and Kem Sokha's
aspirations to fill that void if Rainsy did not return. It
is still too soon to know if Kem Sokha (or others in the
political opposition) will remain on the political sidelines
or decide to start a new party. While it is possible that
FUNCINPEC will wither and splinter as a political party, not
so for the CPP, whose members recognize that one of the CPP's
biggest advantages is holding together as a unified party.
If the SRP does begin to gain more strength in the
countryside, the CPP will likely remain more unified, not
less so. But Rainsy is correct that the political landscape
in Cambodia has shifted dramatically in a short period of
time -- and may continue to do so between now and 2008.

Mussomeli