89STATE308460, U.S. POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA: NEXT STEPS [-Hun Xen's involvment in the murders committed by the KR]

HUN SEN HAS PROVED HIMSELF TO BE AN ABLE POLITICAL

TACTICIAN AND COMPETENT MANIPULATOR OF THE NEWS MEDIA;

HOWEVER, WE CAN ASSUME THAT AS CHIEF OF STAFF AND

REGIMENTAL DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR HIS MILITARY REGION

BEFORE DEFECTING FROM THE KHMER ROUGE TO VIETNAM IN

1977, HUN SEN PARTICIPATED AT A RESPONSIBLE LEVEL IN

THE KIND OF MURDEROUS ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE MADE THE

KHMER ROUGE NAME A BYWORD FOR INFAMY.

Reference ID: 89STATE308460

Created: 1989-09-26 16:09

Released: 2011-08-30 01:44

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

Origin: Secretary of State

O 261609Z SEP 89

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE

INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

SECDEF WASHDC 0000

CIA WASHDC 0000

NSC WASHDC 0000

NSA WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 308460

USCINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL CB US

SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA: NEXT STEPS

¶1. CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT.

¶2. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE PROVIDES POSTS WITH KEY THEMES

TO BE USED WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, THE PRESS, AND OTHER

INTERESTED PARTIES REGARDING OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE

CURRENT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA (SEE PARA 3) AND

INFORMATION ON THE NEXT STEPS WE PLAN TO TAKE (SEE PARA

4). TALKING POINTS FOR SOME SPECIFIC COUNTRIES MAY BE

FOUND IN PARA 5. ALSO INCLUDED IS PRESS GUIDANCE

REGARDING NEXT WEEK'S VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM

CAMBODIA (SEE PARA 6). END SUMMARY.

¶3. KEY THEMES TO BE USED WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, THE

PRESS, AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IN DISCUSSING

CAMBODIA:

GOALS FOR REGION

----------------

THE UNITED STATES SEEKS TO ENHANCE THE POLITICAL

STABILITY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. A

STABLE AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA WILL SERVE

THAT GOAL BY ENDING A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THAILAND AND

REMOVING A SOURCE OF REGIONAL TENSION.

SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD FACILITATE THE INTEGRATION OF

THE COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA INTO THE REGION, IN THE

PROCESS REDUCING THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION,

AND WOULD IMPROVE THE CLIMATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

AFTER A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT, THE CONTINUED STRONG

ECONOMIC LINKS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND THE

MAINTENANCE OF A STABILIZING U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE,

WILL BE WELCOMED IN THE REGION AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A

POSITIVE CLIMATE FOR U.S. INTERESTS.

GOALS FOR A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT

--------------------------------

THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINS COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING

ACTIVELY THE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL EFFORTS UNDERWAY

TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN

CONFLICT.

THESE EFFORTS ARE BASED ON A COMPREHENSIVE DIPLOMATIC

APPROACH WITH THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING A

NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THAT HAS THREE ASPECTS:

1) A VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS;

2) PREVENTION OF A RETURN TO DOMINANCE OF THE KHMER

ROUGE;

3) GENUINE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.

PARIS CONFERENCE MOMENTUM

-------------------------

ALTHOUGH THE PARIS CONFERENCE DID NOT ACHIEVE ANY

BREAKTHROUGHS, MANY SETTLEMENT DETAILS WERE RESOLVED

AND A GENERALLY POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED. THE

CONFERENCE:

A) CONFIRMED THE NECESSITY OF A COMPREHENSIVE

SETTLEMENT. A PARTIAL SOLUTION WAS SEEN AS A RECIPE

FOR CONTINUED VIOLENCE.

B) ACHIEVED A VIRTUAL CONSENSUS THAT THE UN MUST PLAY

THE CENTRAL ROLE IN ANY SETTLEMENT PROCESS.

C) ACCOMPLISHED A GOOD DEAL OF VALUABLE WORK ON THE

SPECIFIC ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN PEACEKEEPING, GUARANTEES,

AND REHABILITATION AND REPATRIATION.

THE CONFERENCE DID NOT, HOWEVER, RESOLVE THE CENTRAL

PHNOM PENH REGIME DID NOT ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATION

REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT

UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK TO GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO

DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS.

ABSENT A VIABLE POLITICAL PROCESS, THE CAMBODIAN

FACTIONS ARE LIKELY TO TURN INCREASINGLY TO MILITARY

MEANS TO RESOLVE THEIR CONFLICT, A RESULT WHICH WILL

BENEFIT NO ONE EXCEPT PERHAPS THE KHMER ROUGE.

THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO LOSE THE VALUABLE MOMENTUM

WHICH THE CONFERENCE HAS GENERATED. WE MUST

EXPEDITIOUSLY CONSIDER HOW TO OVERCOME VIETNAMESE

INTRANSIGENCE AND SUSTAIN THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS. THE

CONFERENCE FRAMEWORK PROVIDES A NEW INSTITUTIONAL TOOL

WE CAN USE IN WORKING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

IN THEIR FINAL STATEMENT, THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

AGREED THAT THE CO-PRESIDENTS, FRANCE AND INDONESIA,

WILL CONTINUE TO FACILITATE THE EFFORTS OF ALL PARTIES

TO WORK TOWARD THE GOAL OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL

SETTLEMENT. IN ADDITION, THE CO-PRESIDENTS HAVE AGREED

TO CONSULT WITH ALL PARTICIPANTS WITHIN SIX MONTHS

REGARDING THE RECONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS

ONLY SUSPENDED.

UNGA RESOLUTION

---------------

AT THIS UNGA, WE WILL WORK WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN

SUPPORT OF THEIR RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA; WE BELIEVE

THAT THIS RESOLUTION ANNUALLY HAS REFLECTED THE OPINION

OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY REGARDING

THE CAMBODIA SITUATION.

VIETNAM'S WITHDRAWAL

--------------------

WE NOTE THAT HANOI HAS ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO

WITHDRAW ITS REMAINING FORCES FROM CAMBODIA LATER THIS

MONTH. THIS WOULD BE WELCOME SINCE VIETNAM'S

WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN A GOAL OF ASEAN AND THE U.S. SINCE

THE VIETNAMESE INVASION MORE THAN TEN YEARS AGO.

HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

WILL ONLY ACCEPT VIETNAM'S CLAIM OF A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL

IF THIS WITHDRAWAL OCCURS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A

CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL MECHANISM, AND WE

BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT THIS MUST BE UNDER UNITED NATIONS

AUSPICES--AND WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

VIETNAM HAS ANNOUNCED A TOTAL OF SEVEN WITHDRAWALS

DURING THE PAST DECADE, WHICH IN MANY CASES TURNED OUT

TO BE TROOP ROTATIONS.

PHNOM PENH HAS ANNOUNCED THAT 24,000 VIETNAMESE CADRES

AND TROOPS HAVE ALREADY LEFT CAMBODIA DURING JUNE AND

JULY 1989; THIS HAS PROVEN IMPOSSIBLE TO CONFIRM.

THIS MONTH'S WITHDRAWAL WILL APPARENTLY BE VIEWED BY

MANY JOURNALISTS AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF

GOVERNMENTS FRIENDLY TO VIETNAM; THERE HAVE BEEN PUBLIC

REPORTS, AND WE HAVE BEEN TOLD PRIVATELY, THAT A NUMBER

OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS, SUCH AS AUSTRALIA, HAVE DECLINED

TO PARTICIPATE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO CONCLUDE A

COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT IN PARIS. THIS HARDLY MEETS

THE CRITERIA OF CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF

THE WITHDRAWAL. ONLY AN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

MECHANISM, PREFERABLY UNDER UN AUSPICES, AND WITH

SUFFICIENT RESOURCES AND UNRESTRICTED ABILITY TO VISIT

ALL AREAS OF CAMBODIA WOULD BE ABLE TO VERIFY THE

ABSENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES.

WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM CAN ONLY OCCUR

AFTER A COMPLETE AND VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE

TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA IN THE CONTEXT RPT IN THE CONTEXT

OF AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE CAMBODIAN

CONFLICT. THE VIETNAMESE KNOW AS WELL THAT, AS A

PRACTICAL REALITY, THE PACE AND SCOPE OF THE

NORMALIZATION PROCESS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THEIR

CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH US ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE AND

OTHER HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS.

IF TROOPS ARE INDEED WITHDRAWN FROM CAMBODIA, WE HOPE

THAT THEY WILL BE DEMOBILIZED IN VIETNAM.

POSITIONING MAJOR TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ON THE

VIETNAMESE-CAMBODIAN BORDER OR IN LAOS WILL ONLY RAISE

FEARS OF VIETNAM'S REINTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA--DESPITE

SRV FOREIGN MINISTER THACH'S CLAIMS THAT VIETNAM WOULD

NEVER RETURN ITS TROOPS TO CAMBODIA.

THACH'S CLAIMS MAY BE CALLED INTO QUESTION BY HUN SEN'S

RECENT COMMENTS THAT "IT IS THE LEGITIMATE R1GHT OF THE

CAMBODIAN PEOPLE" TO CALL FOR OUTSIDE HELP IF THERE IS

OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

POSITIONING VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTHERN LAOS WOULD

ALSO RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT HANOI'S RESPECT IN

GENERAL FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF ITS NEIGHBORS.

UNALTERABLE OPPOSITION TO A KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO POWER

--------------------------------------------- ----------

THE UNITED STATES REMAINS UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO A

RETURN TO POWER OF THE MURDEROUS KHMER ROUGE.

A DURABLE SOLUTION TO THIS CONFLICT MUST BE BASED ON A

COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WHICH INCORPORATES A SERIES OF

EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE KHMER ROUGE WILL BE

CONTAINED.

IN THIS REGARD, WE REGULARLY PRESS ALL THOSE INVOLVED

TO CUT BACK THEIR AID TO THE KHMER ROUGE AND OTHERWISE

HELP CONTROL THE KR IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE

CAMBODIAN SOLUTION.

OUR STRONG PREFERENCE IS THAT THE KHMER ROUGE NOT

PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENTS; HOWEVER,

ASEAN AND PRINCE SIHANOUK HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT

THE BEST APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE KHMER ROUGE IS

THAT THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN A STAKE IN A POLITICAL

PROCESS, ONE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CONSTRAINTS AGAINST

THEIR RETURN TO DOMINANCE. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE MADE

CLEAR THAT OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT ANY CAMBODIAN

GOVERNMENT IS DIRECTLY AND INVERSELY RELATED TO THE

DEGREE OF KHMER ROUGE PARTICIPATION, IF ANY, IN IT.

NON-ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL PHNOM PENH REGIME CONTROL

--------------------------------------------- ---------

AT THE SAME TIME, THE LEADERS OF THE PHNOM PENH REGIME

SHARE THIS UNACCEPTABLE BACKGROUND; MANY ARE FORMER

KHMER ROUGE OFFICIALS FROM THE EASTERN MILITARY ZONE OF

CAMBODIA--INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER HUN SEN, COMMUNIST

PARTY LEADER HENG SAMRIN, AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY LEADER

CHEA SIM.

HUN SEN HAS PROVED HIMSELF TO BE AN ABLE POLITICAL

TACTICIAN AND COMPETENT MANIPULATOR OF THE NEWS MEDIA;

HOWEVER, WE CAN ASSUME THAT AS CHIEF OF STAFF AND

REGIMENTAL DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR HIS MILITARY REGION

BEFORE DEFECTING FROM THE KHMER ROUGE TO VIETNAM IN

1977, HUN SEN PARTICIPATED AT A RESPONSIBLE LEVEL IN

THE KIND OF MURDEROUS ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE MADE THE

KHMER ROUGE NAME A BYWORD FOR INFAMY.

THESE FORMER KR OFFICIALS ALSO REPRESENT AN

ILLEGITIMATE REGIME IMPOSED AND SUSTAINED FOR THE PAST

DECADE BY FOREIGN FORCE OF ARMS; THE PHNOM PENH REGIME

IS ALSO ACQUIRING A SIGNIFICANT REPUTATION FOR

CORRUPTION.

ONLY A COMPROMISE ON POWER-SHARING BASED ON NATIONAL

RECONCILIATION UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PRINCE

SIHANOUK--THE SYMBOL OF TRUE CAMBODIAN NATIONALISM--CAN

ESTABLISH AN AUTHORITY WITH LEGITIMACY FOR THE INTERIM

PERIOD UNTIL ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK

--------------------------------

THE GOAL OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE IN

HELPING TO ACHIEVE AN ACCEPTABLE AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.

WHILE THE CORE OF OUR APPROACH IS A SUSTAINED

DIPLOMATIC EFFORT, WE BELIEVE THAT STRENGTHENING OUR

PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE

CAMBODIAN NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE (NCR) WILL ALLOW THE

NCR TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN A SETTLEMENT WHICH SERVES THE

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE AND PREVENTS A

KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO POWER.

WE ARE NOT ALONE IN SUPPORTING THE NCR; THE

NON-COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVING ASSISTANCE IN A

VARIETY OF FORMS FROM A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. OUR

EFFORTS ARE IN SUPPORT OF AND AT THE REQUEST OF THE

NON-COMMUNISTS AND THESE COUNTRIES.

U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST

RESISTANCE HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE NON-LETHAL. WE

CANNOT OFFER SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THE SUPPORT WE AND

THE OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES ARE PROVIDING; BECAUSE

THIS ASSISTANCE GOES TO GUERRILLA FORCES OPERATING

INSIDE CAMBODIA, ANY DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILS OF THESE

PROGRAMS COULD BE OF POTENTIAL UTILITY TO THE

ADVERSARIES OF THE NCR.

MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR PHNOM PENH REGIME

--------------------------------------------

NEVERTHELESS, WE WOULD POINT OUT THAT OUR SUPPORT FOR

THE NON-COMMUNISTS IS MINOR IN COMPARISON TO THE

MASSIVE QUANTITY OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO

PHNOM PENH BY THE SOVIET UNION, EITHER DIRECTLY OR VIA

VIETNAM--AN AMOUNT ESTIMATED AT $1.1 BILLION BETWEEN

1984 AND 1988.

THERE ARE CONTINUING REPORTS THAT THIS SOVIET

ASSISTANCE--A MASSIVE AMOUNT FOR A COUNTRY OF ONLY

SEVEN MILLION PEOPLE--HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY THIS

YEAR AND IS NOW ESTIMATED TO BE WELL OVER TEN TIMES THE

QUANTITY THE CHINESE CURRENTLY PROVIDE THE KHMER ROUGE.

THESE RECENTLY REPORTED INCREASED TRANSFERS OF

EQUIPMENT TO THE PHNOM PENH REGIME SUGGEST THAT THE PRK

IS MOVING AWAY FROM DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO ACHIEVE A

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN PREPARATION FOR A RETURN TO THE

BATTLEFIELD.

NOT TIME FOR NORMALIZATION WITH VIETNAM

---------------------------------------

IN LIGHT OF ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING

VIETNAMESE INTRANSIGENCE IN PARIS, THE CURRENT

STALEMATE REGARDING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, AND

APPARENT MOVEMENT BACKWARDS TOWARD A MILITARY OPTION,

NORMALIZATION OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM WOULD BE

PREMATURE.

IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, WE BELIEVE THAT OTHER

COUNTRIES SHOULD ALSO MINIMIZE THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND

ECONOMIC/AID RELATIONSHIPS WITH VIETNAM.

¶4. NEXT STEPS FOR U.S. (THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE

FROM A SPEECH BY EAP ASSISTANCE SECRETARY RICHARD

SOLOMON IN LOS ANGELES EARLIER THIS MONTH):

THREE PROPOSITIONS

------------------

THREE PROPOSITIONS UNDERLIE THIS ADMINISTRATION'S

APPROACH TO THIS CONTINUING TRAGEDY:

-- FIRST, CAMBODIA IS A CHALLENGE TO THE CONSCIENCE

AND CONCERN OF THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE

CAMBODIAN PEOPLE DESERVE THEIR OPPORTUNITY FOR NATIONAL

SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, POLITICAL

RECONCILIATION AND DEVELOPMENT -- AND WE WANT TO ENSURE

THAT THERE ARE NO MORE CAMBODIAN KILLING FIELDS. THE

UNITED STATES WILL PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PURSUIT OF

THESE OBJECTIVES, BUT IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT WE

HAVE NEITHER THE POLITICAL POSITION NOR THE RESOURCES

TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES ON OUR OWN.

-- SECOND, OUR PRIMARY SECURITY OBLIGATION IN THIS

REGION IS TO THAILAND, TO WHICH WE ARE LEGALLY BOUND BY

THE MANILA PACT OF 1954. AS WELL, WE HAVE A MAJOR

INTEREST IN THE CONTINUING INTEGRITY AND VITALITY OF

ASEAN.

-- AND THIRD, WE HAVE A STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE IN SEEING

INDOCHINA FREED OF THE RIVALRIES OF THE GREAT POWERS --

AN OBJECTIVE MOST LIKELY REALIZED IF CAMBODIAN AND

VIETNAM ARE AT PEACE WITHIN THEMSELVES AND WITH THEIR

NEIGHBORS.

THREE ACTIVITIES

----------------

GIVEN THESE PROPOSITIONS, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL

PURSUE THREE LEVELS OF ACTIVITY IN THE MONTHS AHEAD,

ALL DESIGNED TO BUILD ON THE DIPLOMATIC MOMENTUM OF

PARIS:

-- WE WILL SUSTAIN ACTIVE CONTACTS WITH THE FIVE

PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. FRANCE,

CHINA, AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE THE MAJOR POWERS WITH

THE MOST DIRECT INFLUENCE AND INTERESTS IN CAMBODIA AND

VIETNAM.

THE SOVIET UNION, AS THE PRIMARY SUPPORTER OF VIETNAM

AND HUN SEN, MUST RESTRICT ITS INCREASING FLOW OF ARMS

INTO CAMBODIA, AND BRING HANOI TO SEE THAT ITS OWN

INTERESTS WILL NOT BE SERVED BY ANOTHER CYCLE OF

WARFARE IN INDOCHINA -- WHICH CERTAINLY WILL BE THE

CASE IF IT SEEKS FULL POWER FOR HUN SEN IN THE ABSENCE

OF A PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.

IN RETURN, HANOI AND HUN SEN -- AND THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY -- HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT CHINA TO EQUALLY

RESTRICT THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE KHMER ROUGE.

INDEED, BEIJING HAS AN OBLIGATION TO TAKE ACTIVE

MEASURES THAT WILL PREVENT THE KHMER ROUGE FROM AGAIN

IMPOSING A MURDEROUS RULE ON THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.

FRANCE, FOR ITS PART, IS DUE CREDIT FOR TAKING THE

DIPLOMATIC RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH TRYING TO HELP THE

CAMBODIAN FACTIONS BRIDGE THEIR DIFFERENCES. WE SHOULD

POINT OUT THAT THE PARIS CONFERENCE WAS ONLY SUSPENDED,

NOT ADJOURNED -- SO THAT FRANCE AND CONFERENCE

CO-CHAIRMAN INDONESIA HAVE A CONTINUING MANDATE TO WORK

FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION.

-- AT A SECOND LEVEL, THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO WORK

CLOSELY WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR

POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT. THEIR

SECURITY INTERESTS ARE MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE

SEARCH FOR PEACE IN INDOCHINA; AND WE WILL SUPPORT

THEIR EFFORTS -- MOST IMMEDIATELY AT THE UPCOMING

SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

-- AND FINALLY, WE WILL SUSTAIN OUR SUPPORT FOR THE

NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE AND PRINCE SIHANOUK AS THE

POLITICAL CENTER OF A PROCESS OF NATIONAL

RECONCILIATION.

SOME NOW ARGUE THAT THE THREAT OF A KHMER ROUGE

RESURGENCE IS SUCH THAT THE U.S. MUST RELY ON HUN SEN

RATHER THAN PRESS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL

SETTLEMENT. THIS APPROACH IS SERIOUSLY FLAWED ON

SEVERAL COUNTS.

FIRST, A REGIME IMPOSED AND SUSTAINED BY FOREIGN FORCE

OF ARMS LACKS LEGITIMACY. VIOLATING THIS FUNDAMENTAL

PRINCIPLE WOULD PUT AT RISK THE INTEGRITY OF THE

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND BE TO OUR PERIL IN MANY OTHER

PARTS OF THE WORLD. SECOND, THERE IS AT PRESENT LITTLE

BASIS FOR ASSUMING THAT HUN SEN'S UNPROVEN FORCES,

ABSENT THEIR VIETNAMESE PROTECTORS, CAN ELIMINATE THE

KHMER ROUGE, A GOAL THAT ELUDED HANOI'S VAUNTED ARMY

FOR THE PAST DECADE. AND LASTLY, IN THE ABSENCE OF A

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SUPPORTED BY PRINCE SIHANOUK, SUCH

A MOVE WOULD PIT THE U.S. AGAINST CAMBODIAN NATIONALISM

-- A POLICY HARDLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

AS DEMOCRATS (WITH A SMALL "D"), OUR COMMITMENT MUST BE

TO A POLITICAL PROCESS THAT PERMITS NATIONAL

SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE. WE SEE

PRESS REPORTS OF HUN SEN'S POPULARITY, OF REFORMIST

POLICIES PROMOTED BY PHNOM PENH THAT ARE RESTORING

BUDDHISM AND ALLOWING PRIVATE PROPERTY AND FREE MARKET

ACTIVITY. IF THE PHNOM PENH REGIME IS AS POPULAR AS

ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN PORTRAYS IT TO BE, IT CAN

ONLY BENEFIT BY TAKING ITS CASE TO THE PEOPLE IN FREE

AND FAIR ELECTIONS SUPERVISED BY THE UN.

THE U.S. REMAINS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF SUCH

A CREDIBLE TEST OF CAMBODIAN PUBLIC OPINION, AND TO

WORK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN SUPPORTING A

PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA THAT

CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS AGAINST A KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO

DOMINANCE.

THUS, THE ISSUE COMES BACK TO WHETHER THE CAMBODIAN

FACTIONS, ENCOURAGED BY THEIR FOREIGN SUPPORTERS, CAN

JOIN TOGETHER IN A POLITICAL PROCESS OF NATIONAL

RECONCILIATION. THE U.S. WILL USE ITS INFLUENCE TO

MOVE EVENTS IN THIS DIRECTION. CHINA AND THE SOVIET

UNION MUST DO THE SAME. MOSCOW, IN PARTICULAR, MUST

ACCEPT AND ACT ON THE REALITY THAT WITHOUT SOME

WILLINGNESS BY VIETNAM AND HUN SEN TO COMPROMISE ON

POWER-SHARING, THERE CAN BE NO NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT,

NO RESPITE FROM ARMED CONFLICT.

¶5. FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS FOR SELECTED

HOST GOVERNMENTS:

AUSTRALIA

---------

WE APPRECIATE THE WAY WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER ON THIS

ISSUE, MOST RECENTLY AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE.

WE BOTH AGREE THAT EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST A KHMER

ROUGE RETURN TO POWER ARE VITAL. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE

THAT THE KEY TO CONTROLLING THE KHMER ROUGE IS A

COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BUILT AROUND THE ESTABLISHMENT

OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK.

THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE DIPLOMATIC AND

ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH

REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART.

WE APPRECIATED YOUR INFORMING THE VIETNAMESE AT THE END

OF THE PARIS CONFERENCE THAT FAILURE TO REACH A

COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WOULD MEAN THAT AUSTRALIA WILL

CONTINUE ITS POLICY OF NOT PROVIDING OFFICIAL AID TO

THE SRV.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO

IGNORE HANOI'S REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN ITS

EFFORTS TO REGAIN ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE IMF.

WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN US IN OPPOSING THE FORMATION

OF A SUPPORT GROUP AND GUARANTEES IN SUPPORT OF A

COMMERCIAL BRIDGE LOAN TO HELP VIETNAM PAY ITS ARREARS

TO THE FUND.

BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND

----------------------------------------

WE WANT TO AGAIN THANK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR THE

CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION THAT OUR DELEGATIONS

ENJOYED THROUGHOUT THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA.

WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE

SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK

WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD

UPON THIS PROGRESS AND ADDRESS THOSE REMAINING

DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS BY THE

DELIBERATIONS.

THE CONFERENCE AGAIN CONFIRMED THAT THE KEY TO ANY

SETTLEMENT IS THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING: HOW TO

CONSTRUCT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK

WHICH WOULD GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS.

THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS, OF COURSE, WAS THE

TOTALLY INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE WHICH HANOI AND THE PHNOM

PENH REGIME ADOPTED ON THIS ISSUE. THIS UNCOMPROMISING

STANCE WAS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE MANNER IN WHICH

PRINCE SIHANOUK APPROACHED THE PROBLEM.

AS A POSSIBLE GUIDE TO THE SHAPE OF A POWER-SHARING

ARRANGEMENT, WE WERE IMPRESSED BY THE SUGGESTIVE OUTLINE

FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH THE ASEAN STATES

PRODUCED AT THE VERY END OF THE CONFERENCE. ALTHOUGH WE

REALIZE THAT THIS PROBLEM BASICALLY MUST BE RESOLVED BY

THE CAMBODIANS THEMSELVES, EFFORTS BY OTHERS CAN BE

HELPFUL IN PROVIDING USEFUL NEW APPROACHES.

IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI

AND PHNOM PENH THAT THEY MUST COMPROMISE, IT IS

ESSENTIAL THAT WE AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST

RESISTANCE MAINTAIN OUR UNITED AND STEADFAST APPROACH

TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM. IT IS VITAL FOR ASEAN TO

CONTINUE TO SPEAK WITH A STRONG AND UNIFIED VOICE IN

PROMOTING A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN

CAMBODIA. ASEAN'S LEADERSHIP AND THE CLOSE ASEAN-U.S.

WORKING RELATIONSHIP WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN

DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF CAMBODIA'S UN SEAT AND DURING

THE DELICATE RENEGOTIATION OF THIS YEAR'S ASEAN

RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE AS HELPFUL AS WE CAN AT THIS

YEAR'S UNGA TO ENSURE STRONG SUPPORT FOR YOUR CAMBODIA

RESOLUTION.

WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE TO MINIMIZE NORMAL

DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE

PHNOM PENH REGIME.

CANADA

------

WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY AGAIN TO THANK

YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR THE CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE

COOPERATION OUR TWO DELEGATIONS MAINTAINED DURING THE

PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA.

WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE

SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK

WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD

UPON THIS PROGRESS AND ADDRESS THOSE REMAINING

DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS BY THE

DELIBERATIONS.

IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI

AND PHNOM PENH THAT THEY MUST COMPROMISE, IT IS

ESSENTIAL THAT WE AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST

RESISTANCE MAINTAIN OUR UNITED AND STEADFAST APPROACH

TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM. WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS

IMPERATIVE TO MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC

INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME.

CHINA

-----

WE WANT TO EXPRESS AGAIN OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE CLOSE

COOPERATION THAT EXISTED IN PARIS BETWEEN OUR TWO

DELEGATIONS.

WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE

SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK

WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD

UPON THE PROGRESS THAT WAS MADE. THE ALTERNATIVE TO

ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT QUICKLY, WE FEAR, WILL BE A

PERIOD OF CIVIL WARFARE. SHOULD THE KHMER ROUGE BEGIN

TO DEMONSTRATE MILITARY SUPERIORITY, THIS WILL RISK

SERIOUSLY UNDERMINING OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE OUR

SUPPORT FOR THE TWO NON-COMMUNIST FACTIONS WITH WHICH

THE KHMER ROUGE IS AFFILIATED.

YOU ARE WELL AWARE OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE KHMER

ROUGE AND THE NEED FOR CONTROLS TO ASSURE THAT THEY DO

NOT RETURN TO POWER IN CAMBODIA. WE WERE VERY

INTERESTED AND APPRECIATIVE OF THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY

YOUR DELEGATION IN PARIS THAT THE KHMER ROUGE'S ROLE IN

AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT COULD BE LESS THAN THE OTHER

FACTIONS.

WE ARE CONTINUING TO URGE THE SOVIETS TO PUSH THE

VIETNAMESE AND HUN SEN TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY ON

THE TRANSITIONAL POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS.

TO AVERT AN ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE IN CAMBODIA, WE ARE

ASKING THE SOVIETS TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF ARMS TO ITS

CAMBODIAN ALLY. SIMILARLY, WE BELIEVE THAT YOU SHOULD

ALSO RESTRICT THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS TO THE KHMER ROUGE.

THE CONTINUED PRESENCE IN CAMBODIA OF SENIOR KHMER

ROUGE LEADERS LIKE POL POT, IENG SARY AND TA MOK IS

PARTICULARLY TROUBLESOME. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO

EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THIS CONFLICT, IF YOUR

GOVERNMENT WOULD STRONGLY ENCOURAGE THESE UNACCEPTABLE

KHMER ROUGE LEADERS TO RELOCATE TO CHINA.

FRANCE

------

WE WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU AGAIN FOR ALL OF THE HARD

WORK THAT YOUR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS STAFF,

ESPECIALLY CLAUDE MARTIN, DEVOTED TOWARD MAKING THE

PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA A SUCCESS.

ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE DID NOT PRODUCE A COMPREHENSIVE

SETTLEMENT, MUCH USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A

GENERALLY POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, IT IS

IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND

ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH

REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART.

IN THIS REGARD, WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY

SHOULD CONTINUE TO IGNORE HANOI'S REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL

ASSISTANCE IN ITS EFFORTS TO REGAIN ACCESS TO THE

RESOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH

AS THE IMF.

WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE FORMATION OF A SUPPORT GROUP AND

TO GUARANTEES IN SUPPORT OF A COMMERCIAL BRIDGE LOAN TO

HELP VIETNAM PAY ITS ARREARS TO THE FUND.

WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO BUILD UPON THE

POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS ACHIEVED AT THE CONFERENCE.

INDONESIA

---------

WE WOULD LIKE AGAIN TO THANK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES

FOR YOUR IMPRESSIVE EFFORTS, ALONG WITH THOSE OF OUR

FRENCH FRIENDS, TO ORGANIZE AND GUIDE THE MONTH-LONG

PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA. WE ADMIRE THE DEDICATION

AND COURAGE YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

DISPLAYED IN UNDERTAKING--DESPITE DAUNTING ODDS--THIS

IMPORTANT INITIATIVE TO EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE TRAGIC

CAMBODIAN CONFLICT.

WHILE WE WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE

SETTLEMENT WHICH WE SOUGHT ELUDED US, MUCH USEFUL WORK

WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BUILD

UPON THE PROGRESS THAT WAS MADE AT THE CONFERENCE AND

ADDRESS THOSE REMAINING DIFFERENCES WHICH WERE BROUGHT

INTO SHARP FOCUS BY THE DELIBERATIONS.

AS A POSSIBLE GUIDE TO THE SHAPE OF A POWER-SHARING

ARRANGEMENT, WE WERE IMPRESSED BY THE SUGGESTIVE

OUTLINE FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH THE ASEAN

DELEGATIONS WERE DISCUSSING AT THE VERY END OF THE

CONFERENCE. IT MAY CONTAIN ELEMENTS YOU WOULD FIND

USEFUL IN ATTEMPTING, UNDER YOUR MANDATE FROM THE

CONFERENCE, TO REVIVE DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE CAMBODIANS

AND OTHER INVOLVED STATES ON THIS KEY ISSUE.

IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI

AND PHNOM PENH THAT THEY MUST COMPROMISE, IT IS

ESSENTIAL THAT WE AS SUPPORTERS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST

RESISTANCE MAINTAIN OUR UNITED AND STEADFAST APPROACH

TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM. OF COURSE, CONTINUED ASEAN

LEADERSHIP IN PROMOTING A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL

SETTLEMENT IS VITAL. WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE

TO MINIMIZE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION

WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME.

JAPAN

-----

WE APPRECIATE THE SOLIDARITY THAT JAPAN HAS SHOWN WITH

US ON THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE AND THE CLOSE COOPERATION

BETWEEN OUR TWO DELEGATIONS DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE.

THE CHIEF IMPASSE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE WAS

THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME ON

THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING; WE SAW NO REAL INTEREST ON

THEIR PARTS IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNDER

PRINCE SIHANOUK'S LEADERSHIP TO GUIDE THE COUNTRY TO

FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.

THUS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONTINUE TO MINIMIZE

DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE

PHNOM PENH REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON

THEIR PART, A POSITION EACH OF US SHARES.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO

IGNORE HANOI'S REQUESTS FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN ITS

EFFORTS TO REGAIN ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE IMF.

WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE FORMATION OF A SUPPORT GROUP AND

TO GUARANTEES IN SUPPORT OF A COMMERCIAL BRIDGE LOAN TO

HELP VIETNAM PAY ITS ARREARS TO THE FUND. WE

APPRECIATE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S STEADFAST SUPPORT ON THIS

ISSUE.

WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TOWARD A

COMPREHENSIVE CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT. AT THIS UNGA, WE

ALSO NEED TO WORK WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT

OF THEIR RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA.

MALAYSIA

--------

WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR THE

COOPERATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP OUR

DELEGATIONS MAINTAINED DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON

CAMBODIA. WE ADMIRED THE ACTIVE ROLE YOUR COUNTRY

PLAYED AT THE MEETING, PARTICULARLY IN THE TAXING JOB

OF CO-CHAIRING THE COMMITTEE ON GUARANTEES.

AS YOU KNOW, THE CHIEF IMPEDIMENT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE

CONFERENCE WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM

PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING; WE SAW NO

REAL INTEREST ON THEIR PARTS IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM

GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK'S LEADERSHIP TO GUIDE

THE COUNTRY TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.

IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE DIPLOMATIC

AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH

REGIME IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON THEIR PART.

IT IS ABSOLUTELY VITAL FOR ASEAN TO CONTINUE TO SPEAK

WITH A STRONG AND UNIFIED VOICE IN PROMOTING A

COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA. ASEAN'S

LEADERSHIP AND THE CLOSE ASEAN-U.S. WORKING

RELATIONSHIP WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN DEALING

WITH THE ISSUE OF CAMBODIA'S UN SEAT AND DURING THE

DELICATE RENEGOTIATION OF THIS YEAR'S ASEAN RESOLUTION

ON CAMBODIA AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

NEW ZEALAND

-----------

WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED A

WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE PERSONNEL TO A

UN-ADMINISTERED INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

MECHANISM/PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. HOPEFULLY, FURTHER

NEGOTIATING EFFORTS WILL MAKE THIS A REALITY.

PHILIPPINES

-----------

(SEE BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND)

SINGAPORE

---------

(SEE BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND)

SOVIET UNION

------------

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK TO CONTINUE THE POSITIVE

MOMENTUM GENERATED BY THE PARIS CONFERENCE. WE EXPECT

THAT IN KEEPING WITH THE CLOSING STATEMENT, CONFERENCE

CO-PRESIDENTS, FRANCE AND INDONESIA, WILL SOON BEGIN

CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CAMBODIAN PARTIES WITH A VIEW

TOWARD REENERGIZING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CORE

POWER-SHARING ISSUE.

TO BE FRANK, HOWEVER, UNLESS HANOI AND PHNOM PENH

CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE AND BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD

FAITH, WE ARE AFRAID THAT ESCALATING VIOLENCE WILL SOON

ADD TO THE MISFORTUNES OF THE LONG-SUFFERING CAMBODIAN

PEOPLE.

INCREASING INSTABILITY IN CAMBODIA WILL ALSO HAVE

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS. IT WILL

REFLECT BADLY ON OUR JOINT COMMITMENT TO RESOLVE

REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND INEVITABLY PROMOTE STRAINS IN

OUR BILATERAL TIES.

WE PLAN TO WORK WITH OUR CAMBODIAN FRIENDS AND OTHER

ALLIES IN THE REGION TO AVOID FURTHER BLOODSHED IN A

COSTLY MILITARY TEST OF STRENGTH AND TO ENCOURAGE A

QUICK RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL JOIN US IN REDOUBLED EFFORTS TO

ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE AND DURABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION

TO THIS PROLONGED REGIONAL CONFLICT. IT IS

PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT ALL OUTSIDE PARTIES TAKE

CONCRETE STEPS TO CURTAIL AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE THE

FLOW OF ARMS INTO CAMBODIA.

TO MOVE THIS POLITICAL PROCESS FORWARD, WE WOULD EXPECT

YOU TO USE YOUR CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE WITH BOTH HANOI

AND PHNOM PENH TO CONVINCE THEM THAT A COMPREHENSIVE

SETTLEMENT BASED ON AN INTERIM CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT LED

BY PRINCE SIHANOUK AND INCLUDING EQUITABLE

REPRESENTATION FOR THE NON-COMMUNISTS AS WELL AS THE

HUN SEN FACTION IS ESSENTIAL. IT IS THE ONLY WAY TO

AVERT A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AND TO

FORESTALL THE LOOMING SPECTER OF A KHMER ROUGE RETURN

TO POWER.

AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO A KR RETURN

TO POWER IN CAMBODIA AND STRONGLY PREFER THAT THEY HAVE

NO ROLE IN ANY CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT.

WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY INDICATIONS THAT BEIJING DID NOT

SUPPORT AN EQUAL ROLE FOR THE KHMER ROUGE IN AN INTERIM

GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVE THAT THIS OPENING SHOULD BE

EXPLOITED TO MINIMIZE ANY ROLE FOR THE KR. WE HOPE

THAT YOU CAN PERSUADE HANOI AND PHNOM PENH TO PURSUE

THIS OPPORTUNITY.

SWEDEN

------

YOUR EMBASSY HAS INFORMED US IN WASHINGTON THAT YOU

HAVE DECLINED THE SRV AND PRK INVITATION TO MONITOR THE

VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL, STATING THAT YOU WOULD ONLY

PARTICIPATE IF ALL PARTIES WERE AGREED AND IF THERE

WERE A COMPLETE SETTLEMENT OF THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE.

WE APPRECIATE THE POSITION OF THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT ON

THIS ISSUE.

THAILAND

--------

(SEE BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND)

UNITED KINGDOM

--------------

WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS AGAIN OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE

COOPERATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP OUR TWO

DELEGATIONS MAINTAINED DURING THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON

CAMBODIA. ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE DID NOT PRODUCE THE

COMPREHENSIVE CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT WHICH WE BOTH

SOUGHT, MUCH USEFUL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND A

GENERALLY POSITIVE MOMENTUM ESTABLISHED.

AS YOU KNOW, THE CHIEF IMPEDIMENT TO THE SUCCESS OF THE

CONFERENCE WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM

PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING; WE SAW NO

REAL INTEREST ON THEIR PARTS IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM

GOVERNMENT UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK'S LEADERSHIP TO GUIDE

THE COUNTRY TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS.

IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT THAT WE MINIMIZE NORMAL

DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION WITH HANOI AND THE

PHNOM PENH REGIME IN ORDER TO ECOURAGE FLEXIBILITY ON

THEIR PARTS.

¶6. THE FOLLOWING EAP PRESS GUIDANCE ON THE VIETNAMESE

WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA WAS PREPARED SEPTEMBER 21,

1989:

Q: THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NOW WITHDRAWN THEIR TROOPS FROM

CAMBODIA. WHAT'S OUR REACTION?

A: WHILE WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED AN

INTERNATIONALLY-VERIFIED WITHDRAWAL, PREFERABLY UNDER

THE AEGIS OF THE UN AND IN THE CONTEXT OF A

COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT, WE

WELCOME HANOI'S APPARENT PULL-OUT AS AN END TO ITS

TEN-YEAR OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA. WE NOTE THAT THIS HAS

BEEN A GOAL OF ASEAN AND THE U.S. SINCE THE VIETNAMESE

INVASION. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT VIETNAM CANNOT

EVADE ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP ACHIEVE IN CAMBODIA A

COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT BASED ON NATIONAL

RECONCILIATION.

Q: WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, WILL THE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL

HAVE ON OUR CAMBODIAN POLICY?

A: THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA, UNFORTUNATELY,

DID NOT ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVE OF FINALIZING A

COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT TO THAT TRAGIC CONFLICT. TO A

LARGE EXTENT, IT WAS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE

PHNOM PENH REGIME ON THE ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING WHICH

PRECLUDED A COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AT THE

CONFERENCE'S INITIAL SESSION.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT MUST BE RESOLVED

POLITICALLY AND NOT ON THE BATTLEFIELD. WE, THEREFORE,

WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE CONFERENCE CO-PRESIDENTS

AND PARTICIPANTS IN BUILDING UPON THE PROGRESS ALREADY

MADE TO MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TOWARD A RESOLUTION.

Q: NOW THAT VIETNAM HAS PULLED ITS TROOPS OUT OF

CAMBODIA AS WE DEMANDED, ARE WE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH

RELATIONS WITH HANOI AS WE AGREED?

¶A. WE AGREED TO JOIN THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA

WITH THE HOPE AND EXPECTATION THAT IT WOULD ACHIEVE A

COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE TRAGIC CAMBODIAN

CONFLICT INCLUDING A VERIFIED TOTAL VIETNAMESE

WITHDRAWAL, ASSURANCES AGAINST THE RETURN OF THE KHMER

ROUGE, AND A PROCESS LEADING TO REAL SELF-DETERMINATION

FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.

IF THE CONFERENCE HAD ACHIEVED THAT OBJECTIVE, WE WERE

PREPARED TO MOVE TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS

WITH HANOI, AS WE HAVE STATED MANY TIMES. THE

VIETNAMESE KNOW AS WELL THAT, AS A PRACTICAL REALITY,

THE PACE AND SCOPE OF THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS WILL BE

AFFECTED BY THEIR CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH US ON THE

POW/MIA ISSUE AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE CONFERENCE REACHED AN IMPASSE ON THE

ISSUE OF POWER-SHARING -- TO A LARGE EXTENT DUE TO THE

INTRANSIGENCE OF HANOI AND THE PHNOM PENH REGIME. THEY

REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE FOR A INTERIM COALITION GOVERNMENT

UNDER PRINCE SIHANOUK, WHICH WOULD LEAD THE COUNTRY TO

DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. THEY CLEARLY INTEND THAT THE PRK

SHOULD MAINTAIN A MONOPOLY OF POWER UNTIL ELECTIONS.

WE, AND MOST OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT THE

CONFERENCE, ARE CONVINCED THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

ARE NOT POSSIBLE UNDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.

WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT SIGNS OF INCREASING

DELIVERIES OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE PHNOM PENH

REGIME AND THE IMPLICATIONS THAT MAY HAVE FOR AN

ESCALATION OF THE VIOLENCE.

IN LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, WE BELIEVE

NORMALIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS WITH HANOI WOULD BE

PREMATURE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT IF THE OTHER

PARTICIPANTS CONTINUE TO MINIMIZE THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND

ECONOMIC TIES WITH VIETNAM, HANOI CAN BE CONVINCED TO

ADOPT A MORE COOPERATIVE APPROACH TOWARD SEEKING A

COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN

CONFLICT.

EAGLEBURGER