Rwanda: A parallel to Cambodia's current political conditions

Efficiency versus freedom

Rwanda and other aid darlings

The West should not be silent when efficient leaders, such as Rwanda’s, squash the opposition

Aug 5th 2010
The Economist

THE differences between tiny Rwanda and the rest of Africa are immediately palpable even to the most casual visitor. The discarded plastic bottles and bags that pollute almost every other country on the continent are nowhere to be seen: the government has banned them. The tarred roads are usually in good shape; speed limits are actually enforced, by smart traffic police who fill out paperwork in exchange for a statutory fine rather than shaking you down for a bribe. Transparency International, an anti-corruption watchdog, rates Rwanda as one of the more honest countries in Africa. The World Bank says it is the fastest-improving as a place to do business. Hotels in the capital, Kigali, brim with Westerners attending conferences. Paul Kagame (above), the president who has overseen all this, is a darling of the aid-giving world. Western governments and prominent religious leaders have hailed him as the sort of man in whom to put their faith—and money.

Considering that Rwanda witnessed one of the most appalling waves of barbarity in history just 16 years ago, when around 800,000 people were hacked to death in three months, the efficiency is extraordinary. So much has gone admirably right in terms of development. But a lot is going depressingly wrong in politics. Mr Kagame has become more ruthless and authoritarian. In the run-up to the election on August 9th the opposition has suffered grievously. So where should the balance between development and freedom lie? Can democracy be shoved aside in the battle against poverty? And what should outsiders do to tilt the balance back?

The dilemma is not exclusive to Rwanda. The West has long sought leaders, such as Mr Kagame, who can be relied on to spend aid money well. Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and even, for a time, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo have been singled out for favoured treatment. Their countries have been graced with aid cash, debt forgiveness and political support. The West’s selective generosity has been prompted by various motives: guilt over past colonial wrongs; genuine altruism; and domestic self-interest that enabled left-of-centre parties to display their moral credentials abroad while reluctantly accepting the triumph of capitalism at home.

In Rwanda this has been taken to an extreme. Western guilt, which Mr Kagame has cleverly exploited, has been deeply felt. In 1994 the United States, the UN and Europe stood idly by as the genocide exploded. Since he took over a decade ago, Mr Kagame has happily presented himself as a development model for the whole continent, looking to Singapore rather than neighbouring Congo, a country far richer in resources whose people remain sunk in poverty as politicians feud and loot. In an effort to foster a sense of national unity and purpose, Mr Kagame has tried to abolish ethnic division between the Tutsi minority (to which he belongs) and the Hutu majority, whose members committed the genocide, by legislating their names out of the lexicon. Anyone challenging his “one Rwanda” policy, where Tutsis and Hutus no longer exist, can be jailed for “divisionism”.

The run-up to the election has been particularly ugly. The charge of divisionism has been used to swat criticism. Critical newspapers have been closed down, a reporter from one of them shot dead outside his home. Victoire Ingabire, head of an opposition party that has been barred from registering for the poll, has been charged with genocide denial and put under house arrest. Another opposition leader has been accused of terrorism. And the deputy head of a third party has been killed. The government denies involvement in all this and no solid evidence contradicts it (see article). But newspapers favouring Mr Kagame now describe his critics as “cockroaches” and “traitors”, the same insults that Hutu extremists used to egg on the massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in 1994.

It mustn’t be either/or

Messrs Kagame, Meles and Museveni have all improved their countries’ lot. But election time invariably shows up the flaws in their model. All three leaders are growing more autocratic the longer they cling to office. The West has invested too much, financially and emotionally, in a select handful of charismatic aid darlings. Too often the aid lobbies have cheered them on, loth to acknowledge the flaws in people they need to prove that aid works. Too seldom has anybody promoted the more boring business of helping to build and reform institutions.

Withdrawing aid would be a blunt tool and, at any rate in the short run, would hamper the battle against poverty. But in the longer run, material development will suffer if authoritarian habits turn into tyranny. Those in the West who rightly praise Mr Kagame for his achievements in development must also loudly lambast him for his loathsome and needless tendency to intolerance.

To live and die with Hun Sen

Jan 22, 2010
By Paul Vrieze Asia Times Online

"But when survival is your life goal you cannot have any vision. This is why Cambodia under Hun Sen is going nowhere, if not down the drain, [through] corruption, poverty, human-rights abuses, in spite of competent civil servants, dedicated civil society and abundant natural resources ... Hun Sen has had only two ways in dealing with his political opponents: Buy them or eliminate them either physically, [through] grenade attack, military coup [...] or politically, [through] sham lawsuits ... There is no example in the whole world of any country being a democratic and prosperous one with the same top leader for decades" - Sam Rainsy

PHNOM PENH - Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen recently marked his 25th anniversary as the Southeast Asian nation's leader. First appointed by the Cambodian National Assembly on January 14, 1985, he became at 33 years old the youngest prime minister in the world.

Hun Sen's journey from a communist leader to an elected head of government spans a quarter of a century of civil war, domestic and international upheaval, a negotiated peace and transition to democracy through which he and his Cambodia's People's Party (CPP) have imposed themselves as the country's deliverers of stability and order.

By retaining the helm in Cambodia's fractious politics for 25 years, he now stands among a unique category of leaders, ranking as the 11th-longest ruling leader in the world. In Southeast Asia, only the Sultan of Brunei, the number one longest-serving government leader since assuming office in 1967, has been in power longer than Hun Sen. Of the other nine longer-serving leaders, five are heads of governments in Africa and four are from the Middle East.

Hun Sen reflected on his long political career and humble beginnings in a speech at the National Institute for Education in Phnom Penh on January 12. "I became [foreign] minister when I was 27 years old, deputy prime minister when I was 29 years old and prime minister at 33 years old," Hun Sen said of his appointments in the People's Republic of Kampuchea - the communist state set up by Vietnam in 1979 after it toppled the Khmer Rouge, whose bloody regime caused the death of about 1.7 million Cambodians.

He recalled how he joined the anti-republican maquis, a movement which consisted of several resistance groups including the Khmer Rouge, in April 1970, explaining his move was "based on an appeal from King [Norodom] Sihanouk", Cambodia's monarch who had been ousted in a coup d'etat earlier that year. "Throughout 40 years, I have known all kinds of tastes. I knew how my commander commanded the troops and I knew how to make tea for him. I knew how to wash clothes for him," Hun Sen said in his now trademark plain-speaking public-address style.

The prime minister went on to talk about his political future, confirming his intention to run in the next election in 2013. "The party conference announced my candidacy for the future prime minister and ... last week Chea Sim [president of the CPP] also reconfirmed my nomination for the premiership," Hun Sen said before taking aim at opposition parties.

"Please do not try to limit the mandate of the premiership. You want the mandate limited because you are worrying you will lose to me," he said, while also reminding the audience he still had another three-and-a-half years in office under the mandate of the 2008 election, which his party, the CPP, won with a two-thirds legislative majority.

Hun Sen started on his political path in 1978, when he became a founding member of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation after fleeing to Vietnam in 1977 to avoid Khmer Rouge purges in the Eastern Zone, where he had been a Khmer Rouge regimental commander. The Front consisted of former Khmer Rouge cadres who were prepared by Vietnamese officials to become Cambodia's new leadership after the removal of the Khmer Rouge government.

The Vietnamese army and the Front brought down the Democratic Kampuchea regime on January 7, 1979, in reaction to bloody raids by Khmer Rouge forces into Vietnamese territory in 1978. As the Front's leaders assumed their positions in the new PRK government after the Khmer Rouge regime was toppled, Hun Sen became foreign minister.
The early years
Current and former government officials and people who knew Hun Sen in his youth or as a budding young communist leader said his rhetorical talents and ability to lead, learn, adapt and survive the changing political and ideological terrain in Cambodia were apparent from the start in his personality.

Hun Sen was born as Hun Bunnal on August 5, 1952, in Peam Koh Snar in Kompong Cham province, a village of tobacco farmers located on the banks of the Mekong River. Local villager Chhe Noeun, 61, who claimed to be a childhood friend of the premier, said during a visit to the village that he spent much time listening to his younger friend talk. "He was one of the kids who was smarter than the others. His speaking, his rhetoric, was very good. During farm work, he liked to chat a lot, he made a lot of jokes," he said.

Noeun said Hun Sen left the village to stay in a Buddhist pagoda in the capital when he was about 16 years old. The Hun family, he said, had left the village in about 1963 to move to Memot district, located on the Vietnamese border, but they returned in 1969 after the start of the American bombing campaign in east Cambodia.

After Hun Sen left the village, Noeun said, he did not see him again until 1974 when he showed up on a motorbike at a local primary school as a Khmer Rouge cadre carrying an AK-47 rifle. Hun Sen told his friend, "I just came again today and I don't know when I will come back or if I will die."

Veteran CPP lawmaker Cheam Yeap said during an interview last week that he remembered Hun Sen exhibited leadership qualities and a capacity to learn quickly early in his career. These skills, Yeap said, allowed Hun Sen to gain loyalty from his staff, to impress officials from Vietnam, whose military remained in Cambodia from 1979 to 1989, and to sway members of the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party - the previous name of the CPP.

"I met him in 1979 ... He was the youngest foreign minister in the world," Yeap recounted. "Even though he was five years younger than me, I saw he was hard working," he said. "[Hun Sen] only finished grade 3 or 4, before joining the resistance movement. Even though he studied a little bit, he learned very fast," Yeap said. "He liked to communicate with people, especially with those with more experience."

One man who takes a darker view of the young Hun Sen and his rise to power is Pen Sovann, the first prime minister of the PRK, who served as premier for only a few months in 1981 before being arrested and held under house arrest in Hanoi for nine years by the Vietnamese government. "Vietnam ordered me to be arrested by 12 armed soldiers. Hun Sen was there to read the charges against me," Sovann said during an interview at his Takeo province home. Sovann said he was purged by the Vietnamese authorities because of his independent political leadership and his opposition to a number of government policies proposed by Vietnam.

He claimed Hun Sen was appointed prime minister in 1985 because "[Vietnamese authorities] believed and depended on Hun Sen as they believed he would do everything for Vietnam." The former prime minister, who knew Hun Sen from the time he joined the Front in Vietnam, characterized him as smart and a talented public speaker, but also as an authoritarian with few scruples.

"He learns very fast and then he can lecture [on a topic] later on," he said. "Hun Sen has outstanding capacities. His intellect is strong, but he has no morals to go along with it." Sovann said he was "not surprised" by Hun Sen's world-beating political longevity. "Hun Sen likes power; he wants to increase his power. He doesn't listen to anyone ... If anyone criticizes him, he will do anything to defend his power."

Following the Paris Peace Agreements in the early 1990s and the subsequent United Nations-supervised transition from a Vietnamese-backed communist government to a fledgling democracy, Hun Sen quickly showed he was a clever politician who could woo Cambodia's largely rural and uneducated electorate. By the end of the decade, he had also managed to disband the Khmer Rouge step by step by offering amnesty to defectors.

Despite his political skills, Hun Sen did not shy away from using violence against political opposition. In 1997, he took over the government by force and the ensuing fighting killed about 100 people, mostly from the rival Funcinpec Party, according to a 2008 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, which referred to the takeover as an "unlawful seizure of power".

Before the military takeover, a grenade attack hit a peaceful opposition rally in Phnom Penh, which killed 16 children, men and women and wounded more than 100 others. Recent disclosures of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) probe into the attack, which was conducted because an American citizen was injured in the blast, were made under a Freedom of Information Act request filed by The Cambodia Daily, a local English-language newspaper.

The investigation, which was cut short due to intensifying threats to the FBI agent, found evidence that directly implicated Hun Sen's bodyguard unit and the CPP, while highly placed witnesses declined to cooperate with the FBI, according to the records disclosed to the newspaper. The US government reacted to the violent events of 1997 by banning direct aid to Cambodia for a decade. As the US Congressional Research Service noted, "The autocratic tendencies of Prime Minister Hun Sen have discouraged foreign investment and strained US-Cambodian relations."
Mixed reviews
Although opinions vary among researchers and observers on Hun Sen's accomplishments during his 25-year reign, most acknowledged the transformation of war-torn Cambodia into a stable, peaceful country with an open and growing economy as his principal achievement. Before economic growth came to a halt last year due to the global economic crisis, Cambodia's economy grew an average 9.5% per year from 2002 to 2008, according to a recent World Bank report.

However, human-rights abuses, land evictions, rampant corruption among government officials, a lack of an independent judiciary and intimidation of political opponents have also been part of life in Cambodia under Hun Sen, local and international human-rights groups have said. Last year saw a rise in court cases against political opponents and other critics of Hun Sen.

Opposition leader Sam Rainsy, of the eponymous political party, is currently in France but facing criminal charges in Cambodia over the removal of boundary posts along the border with Vietnam. Rainsy said Hun Sen had shown during his long premiership that his objectives were personal and did not serve ordinary Cambodians. "It is obvious that Hun Sen's only or predominant goal is to remain in power, to survive politically ... Power is everything for him. But above all, power means impunity for him and his clan," Rainsy wrote in an e-mail.

"But when survival is your life goal you cannot have any vision. This is why Cambodia under Hun Sen is going nowhere, if not down the drain, [through] corruption, poverty, human-rights abuses, in spite of competent civil servants, dedicated civil society and abundant natural resources," he wrote. "Hun Sen has had only two ways in dealing with his political opponents: Buy them or eliminate them either physically, [through] grenade attack, military coup [...] or politically, [through] sham lawsuits ... There is no example in the whole world of any country being a democratic and prosperous one with the same top leader for decades," Rainsy added.

According to historian Evan Gottesman, author of the 2003 book Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen's durability is in itself exceptional. "The fact that the same man who led Cambodia in 1985 could also run the Cambodia of 2010 is remarkable," Gottesman said via e-mail. "Hun Sen's most impressive achievement was his ability to lead Cambodia from being an isolated communist country to economic and political integration with the non-communist countries of the region," he said.

"Hun Sen's greatest failure is his failure to promote, in fact, his willingness to undermine democratic institutions such as an independent judiciary, accountable security forces and a professional civil service," he added. According to Gottesman, three qualities are central to Hun Sen's hold on power: The first is ideological flexibility, which he said became apparent when Hun Sen decided to quickly abandon communist orthodox ideas in the late 1980s when it suited the situation.

"The second is a willingness to be absolutely ruthless with his opponents when he feels it necessary. The third is his cultivation of a patronage system that supports him," Gottesman wrote. "[A] lack of an independent judiciary or accountability for human-rights abuses persist because these hallmarks of modern democracies do not serve the interests of leaders who intend to remain in power indefinitely," he added. Reflecting on how the character of the 1980s communist PRK regime, many of whose officials are still in the government, influences Cambodia today, Gottesman said, "Cambodia's government is still built on patronage systems that support top officials, with Hun Sen at the top."
Rights and wrongs
International environmental watchdog Global Witness said in a February 2009 report entitled "Country for Sale" that its research indicated revenues from Cambodia's growing oil and mining industries were being siphoned off by a network of corrupt officials. "Rather than using these millions to lift its people out of poverty, Cambodia's government could instead continue to follow the example of neighboring Burma [Myanmar], where an autocratic elite uses money generated from the country's natural resource wealth to rule over an impoverished majority," the report warned.

Janice Beanland from rights group Amnesty International's Southeast Asia Team said in an e-mail that the protection of human rights in Cambodia under Hun Sen had come "a very long way" since the 1985 communist regime. However, she added that his government had often failed to undertake serious attempts to further improve the country's human-rights record, which remains poor. "[T]he lack of accountability and the culture of impunity that held sway [in the 1980s] remains in place to quite a degree. Judicial reform remains a plan, rule of law is not yet in place and for most Cambodians, there is very limited protection for human rights," Beanland said.

"[I]f the prime minister had wanted to institutionalize human-rights protection - through the legal system, the government administrative structures and independent institutions - he would have had the power to do so," she said. "The continued lack of integrity and independence within the court system, for instance, testifies to the limited human-rights commitment of the government."

Chea Vannath, a local independent political analyst, said Hun Sen's most important accomplishment was restoring peace in Cambodia, while adding that his premiership had lacked in economic management and improving child and maternal health. "His achievement is that he was able to bring peace to Cambodia, a very valuable achievement. His shortcoming is the economy, it moves but it stumbles ... It seems the economy could have done better, maternal and child health should also be better," she said.

Vannath said Hun Sen's strengths included his ability to cope and navigate a changing political climate and system, his ability to equitably share political power with others and his vigilance to not rest on his laurels."So far, another blessing is [his] good health," she added.

According to historian Henri Locard, who has taught at the Royal University of Phnom Penh since the early 1990s, one of Hun Sen's primary skills is his ability to fascinate the Cambodian public. "Hun Sen is a past-master in the control of rhetoric ... He is sure to hold the majority of the population by the invisible thread and the fascination of his words," Locard said. After the dark days of the Khmer Rouge and the communist government, Cambodians now "relish all their newly-acquired freedoms", he said, adding, "With one major exception: the freedom to challenge his all-embracing power ... there is a great deal of self-censorship exerted in this country."

Indeed, many civil society members and researchers consulted for this article, foreign and local, declined to comment directly on Hun Sen's premiership. CPP lawmaker Cheam Yeap contested Hun Sen's record of human-rights abuses, tolerance of corruption and intimidation of political opponents. "Fighting corruption is not easy. Europe and the US have these problems too," he said. "Sam Rainsy breaks the law and then he says his rights are violated when he gets charged."

Yeap contended that Hun Sen and other CPP members had built up the country after its near-complete destruction by the Khmer Rouge. "I would like to ask you who could do it? [Opposition leaders] Sam Rainsy, Ranariddh, Kem Sokha couldn't do it ... They came later on, then they demanded this, they demanded that. They want freedom to attack everyone, everything. The CPP cannot allow them to do that."

On December 27, the 25th anniversary of his appointment as acting prime minister, Hun Sen met with members of his family at a hotel in Phnom Penh and contemplated a time when he no longer ruled Cambodia. Should that day come, according to Hun Sen, members of his powerful extended family could find the tables turned against them if they alienated ordinary Cambodians.

"If Hun Sen loses power, you will become a target for attacks if you do not follow my advice," he said during his televised remarks, advising his family that they should show charity and concern for the less fortunate. It was a rare reflection by the strongman leader on the eventual limits of his rule.
Paul Vrieze is a reporter with the Phnom Penh-based The Cambodia Daily. Phann Ana, also a reporter at the newspaper, contributed to the reporting.

Hun Sen: The Oligarchic Ruler Of Cambodia?

Sunday, June 15, 2008
Editorial by Khmerization
On the web at http://khmerization.blogspot.com

Click here to read Dam Sith's release

“Cambodia of today has been superficially viewed in many misleading ways. On the surface, it appears to be a full functioning parliamentary democracy, with the parliament and the prime minister elected for a 5-year term. Deep down, Cambodia is nothing but governed by an oligarchy - a government run by a small kleptocratic or plutocratic group with Prime Minister Hun Sen as the head.”

My poor Cambodia and her subjects have been governed by clumsy rulers for many generations. One way or the other, she has been ruled and misruled by despots, incompetent and corrupt leaders or simply by a small group of kleptocratic and plutocratic oligarchs. It is this reality that Cambodia remained poor and backward for generations.

Cambodia of today has been superficially viewed in many misleading ways. On the surface, it appears to be a full functioning parliamentary democracy, with the parliament and the prime minister elected for a 5-year term. Deep down, Cambodia is nothing but governed by an oligarchy - a government run by a small kleptocratic or plutocratic group with Prime Minister Hun Sen as the head.

The sad reality is that Cambodia of today is ruled or misruled by one man. Cambodia, if analysed thoroughly, has a hallmark of a despotic one-man show with his kleptocratic or plutocratic elites as his backbones and lifelines. His kleptocratic and plutocratic oligarchs are allowed to plunder and pillage Cambodia’s natural resources and to rob the villagers’ lands at free will. And with a stroke of a one man’s pen anything is achievable.

Coming back to my discussion topic, I would like to draw an attention of the readers of this article to one recent classic example of a one man rule. Many would view or tend to believe that Dam Sith’s arrest was simply derived from a defamation law suit brought on him by Foreign Minister Hor Namhong. In my opinion, Hor Namhong’s defamation suit was just a pretext used to harass and victimise opposition politicians. Dam sith’s arrest was a case of a concerted effort by the Cambodia People Party’s (CPP) leadership, in particular Mr. Hun Sen, to get Sam Rainsy or simply to frighten him into fleeing the country. Facing with electoral defeat, the CPP and in particular PM Hun Sen, has deployed their effective weapons to kill Rainsy’s victory chances - and that is to destroy his party with coerced defections and with their intimidation tactic in order to send Rainsy into exile. But, this time, their attempt failed miserably because Rainsy was not intimidated. Realising that his tactic didn’t work, coupled with strong pressures from local and international human right groups, Mr. Hun Sen capitulated and, with a stroke of his pen, Dam Sith was set free.

The arrest of Dam Sith and his release from prison with only a stroke of a pen of a single man proved that Cambodia is a lawless state. While I applaud and appreciate the PM’s intervention for Mr. Dam Sith’s release, I also condemn with the way in which his incarceration and exoneration was handled. It was apparent that his arrest was orchestrated by Mr. Hor Namhong with Mr. Hun Sen’s blessing. The court or the poor judge was simply used as a political tool to formalise and legitimise the arrest. This was evident with Mr. Hun Sen’s intervention, when due judicial process was bypassed.

I agreed with Mr. Sam Rainsy when he said that, when a single person decides everything, a lot of time and energy was wasted. The Dam Sith saga has used up a lot of energy and has diverted a lot of attention from the more serious issues of land disputes, youth unemployment, health or economic problems that the nation is facing today. The problems facing the nation should be a more urgent issue of a responsible government. On the contrary, an irresponsible and a selfish PM thinks of nothing other than how to outsmart his opponents in order to rule forever. The resulting effect was that Cambodia and her people are the victims of his clumsy and selfish leadership. And Cambodia remained poor and backward, even with billions of international aid. This is what happens when a small group of kleptocratic or plutocratic oligarchs misruled the country.

Damming Public Opinion: The risks of China's economic diplomacy in Cambodia

April 4, 2008
By Devin T. Stewart
Posted at Policy Innovations

In this increasingly interconnected age, the role of public opinion has grown in many areas of life—from corporate valuations in the form of brands to political influence in the form of soft power. With these trends in mind, China's approach to dealing with global public opinion, be it over Tibet or Darfur, carries risks.

Symbols of control

China's style of economic diplomacy may become one of the greatest questions of our time. While the rich democratic countries attempt to pursue development strategies that are people friendly, emphasizing human rights and environmental standards, China is said to be following a strategy that is regime friendly, focusing on local practices, practical results, and infrastructure development. For this reason, some observers have argued that China's approach may be more appealing to the elite in less democratic countries in Africa and Asia.

Unfortunately, the enormous dams that China is constructing both inside its borders and in the countries where it invests may become a symbol for a flawed approach to coping with an increasingly powerful public opinion. From the Three Gorges Dam to the "Great Firewall" of Internet censors in China to the planned dams of the Mekong River, China hopes dams can provide growth and stability. For how long can China dam public opinion?

Money first, governance later

A potentially powerful dynamic playing out in China's relations with the developing world emerged during a recent trip I took to Cambodia. Looking at the potential oil and gas boom in Cambodia, my research investigated the possible impact of natural resource revenue on Cambodian society and governance.

It is widely known that China is willing to deal with authoritarian regimes, but these relationships may end up sparking a backlash against China in the developing world. As UNDP head Kemal Dervis said at a recent conference at New York's New School, the greatest threats to development may be social instability from inequality and environmental degradation, not macroeconomic stress. This sentiment was a major theme in many of my interviews in Phnom Penh.

"China is making Cambodia move backward," said Son Chhay, a Cambodian opposition party lawmaker. He explained that China's involvement with Cambodia's authoritarian regime is erasing the progress the country made in human rights and democratic development. One effect is that Western donors may have to weaken their demands for better governance just to keep up with the growing influence of Chinese investment.

During the last decade, the main source of foreign influence had been nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working with aid donors. Now, China's presence is shifting the balance, potentially exacerbating the two risks that worry Dervis. For example, China's distaste for making aid contingent on policy indicators may worsen the already rampant corruption in Cambodia. Most observers predict that at least half of the oil and gas revenue would go into the personal bank accounts of corrupt officials.

Hydro power without people's power

"You could have a people power movement in the next two to three years if the government fails to create the million jobs needed. The youth will go to the street because they have nothing to loose," Son Chhay said. He predicts upcoming elections will fail to be democratic. Half of the population is young and unhappy with the government, and they have no memory of the genocide of Pol Pot and therefore no fear of authority. One target could be Chinese-owned businesses.

While my trip to Cambodia was to examine the impact of possible oil and gas revenue, it became clear that the planned Mekong dam and its symbolic implications were at least as important. "The big story is hydropower. Cambodia relies on the Mekong and damming will have devastating consequences on food and welfare," said a Western diplomat based in Cambodia.

Civil society groups such as Cambodia's NGO Forum are questioning the country's plan to become "the battery of Southeast Asia," especially for energy-hungry Thailand and Vietnam, with the help of Chinese state companies, which are in turn financed by Chinese state financial institutions. Without thorough and transparent social and environmental impact assessments, NGO groups worry that the dam projects in Cambodia and Laos could disrupt fish migration patterns in the Mekong River.

The coming fallout

"Cambodia's future rests on a knife's edge," as one senior economic researcher put it. The path the country will take depends on the foreign influence coming to Cambodia, he explained. If Chevron decides that the energy resources off of Cambodia's coast are worth pursuing, the American company could possibly bring more transparency and accountability to Cambodia's economy. If not, China will become the dominant source of external influence given that its total investment in the country now exceeds that of any other donor.

In the long-term, when the voice of the people is stifled, it hurts the advancement that comes through the positive interaction between civil society and corporations. Pietra Rivoli wrote about this in her book "The Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global Economy." This problem will haunt China's development strategies both within its borders and in its relations with other countries.

It seems cracks are forming in China's dams, literally and metaphorically. "China cannot survive the system it is creating," Son Chhay concluded. "I predict a crisis in China before they enter the real world."